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Abstract 
An agricultural price range system (PRS) aims to stabilize local prices in an open economy via the use 
of import duties that vary with international prices. The policy is inherently distortionary and welfare-
reducing for a small open economy, at least according to the canonical economic model. We offer an 
explanation for why a government concerned with national welfare may nevertheless implement such 
a policy when faced with risk aversion and imperfect insurance markets. We also highlight open 
questions arising out of the Peru – Agricultural Products dispute for the WTO’s Appellate Body to 
address in order to clarify how a PRS consistent with WTO rules could be designed. Finally, we 
discuss the possibility that a WTO member might resort to a free trade agreement (FTA) to preserve 
its flexibility to implement a PRS and how an FTA provision of this sort ought to be treated in WTO 
litigation. 
Keywords 
Agriculture; free trade agreement; price range system; WTO law 
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1. Introduction* 
For developing economies, the question of whether to further liberalize trade often hinges on the 
potential impact of trade liberalization on the domestic agricultural sector. The outsized role played by 
this sector in employment, economic production, and social security means that governments tread 
rather carefully when assessing what types of agriculture-related concessions to offer in exchange for 
gains in other sectors. This is especially the case for small economies that lack the ability to shape 
world prices. 
In the course of opening up agricultural markets, governments in small economies are consumed 
with two competing concerns: On the one hand, they fear that prices for agricultural goods may 
suddenly drop, leaving farmers exposed to negative income shocks. On the other hand, they also worry 
that prices may suddenly spike, triggering inflationary concerns and harming consumers. To guard 
against these concerns, some governments have chosen to liberalize trade while simultaneously 
retaining some form of a price range system (PRS) that helps insulate the domestic market from 
fluctuations in word prices. 
By far the more common policy discussed in this context is the notion of a price band system 
(PBS). It may be worthwhile, at the onset, to distinguish between a PRS and a PBS, especially since 
the terms are sometimes used interchangeably. While both policy instruments seek to mitigate the 
local effects of fluctuations in global prices by keeping the price of imports within a given band/range, 
their exact mechanics differ slightly.  
Under a PBS, the government sets a particular floor and ceiling price. Whenever the import price 
falls below this range, an additional tariff is imposed equal to the difference between the floor price 
and import price, bringing the local price of the import back up to the floor price. Similarly, whenever 
the import price exceeds the ceiling price, a tariff rebate equal to the difference between the import 
price and ceiling price is issued. This brings the local price of the import back down to the ceiling 
price. The additional tariff/rebate may be subject to additional adjustment, as necessary. Overall, it 
should serve to keep the price of the imported good within the desired price band. 
A PRS operates in much the same way as a PBS, except that the adjustments are not made on a 
transaction-specific basis. Again, the government sets a floor and ceiling price, which may be altered 
over time. Instead of comparing the floor and ceiling prices against the actual import price, however, 
the comparison is made against a reference price. The reference price is set periodically through 
reliance on some external benchmark or a pre-determined formula. It may be tweaked with time, at an 
interval different than that of the floor and ceiling prices. Whenever the reference price falls below the 
floor price, an additional tariff is imposed equal to the difference between the floor price and reference 
price. Similarly, whenever the import price exceeds the ceiling price, a tariff rebate equal to the 
difference between the import price and ceiling price is issued. Again, the additional tariff/rebate may 
be subject to additional adjustment, as necessary.  
Note that unlike a price band, the additional tariff/rebate associated with the PRS does not vary 
with each given transaction. Instead, it is fixed for a given period of time – i.e., the period for which 
the reference price is constant, regardless of the actual import price. It only changes if the reference, 
floor, and/or ceiling price are altered. Nevertheless, the PRS fulfills a similar objective of tweaking 
duties to keep the price of imported goods within a given price range. In doing so, the PRS allows a 
government some degree of control to guard against the unwelcome effects of agricultural trade 
liberalization.  
                                                     
*
 For helpful comments and discussion, we thank Kyle Bagwell, Rick Bond, Petros Mavroidis, and participants at the 2014 
WTO Case Law Conference held at the European University Institute, May 2015. In addition, we are grateful for insights 
provided by several individuals involved in the litigation proceedings who wish to remain anonymous. 
Kamal Saggi and Mark Wu 
2 
Not surprisingly, such systems are not without controversy. A PRS seeks to alter price artificially 
and therefore distorts trade away from the market-equilibrium level. By revising duties in conjunction 
with the ceiling and floor price, the policy artificially limits gains for foreign producers within the 
given market. Some trading partners may therefore naturally view the policy as a protectionist 
instrument cast in the guise of a price stabilization instrument.  
To date, PRS regimes have not received much attention in the academic legal literature, particularly 
with respect to agricultural trade and developing countries in which they are most commonly found. 
Much of the existing scholarship has focused on how other forms of trade-related distortions in global 
agricultural markets, such as subsidies and export taxes, that are more commonly imposed by 
developed countries. Yet, as the recent Peru – Agricultural Products dispute1 demonstrates, PRS 
policies also can give rise to trade distortions that harm farmers in other developing countries. 
Using the Peru – Agricultural Products dispute as a case study, we seek to address three questions 
related to this phenomenon: 
First, why would a small developing country choose to implement a PRS? Does such a policy 
always represent a rent transfer to special interest group(s) that is overall welfare-reducing? Or can it 
be welfare-enhancing under particular conditions? We demonstrate that a PRS, when considered under 
the canonical model of a small open economy with risk neutral consumers and producers that take 
world prices as given, is sub-optimal. Indeed, price variability is desirable because the gains from 
trade enjoyed by an open economy depend upon whether and how much the world price of a 
commodity differs from its autarkic price. When the world price of a commodity is below the price 
that prevails in a country’s local market in the absence of trade, it ends up importing that commodity 
and enjoys net gains from trade. While import competing domestic producers lose from trade, the 
increase in consumer surplus dominates their loss. Indeed, the lower the world price relative to a 
country’s autarkic price, the larger its gains from trade. A PRS band supported by fluctuating tariffs 
reduces the extent to which the price in a country differs from its autarkic price and therefore reduces 
its expected gains from trade. However, a PRS does ensure that the welfare of consumers and 
producers do not fall below a certain minimum threshold as a result of agricultural trade liberalization. 
We argue that a PRS can be justified as welfare-enhancing in the presence of significant risk aversion 
on the part of either group. If some factors of production are immobile ex-post and insurance markets 
are incomplete, some level of trade protection can be optimal for a small open economy facing 
fluctuating terms of trade (Eaton and Grossman 1985). Thus, a PRS serves as an imperfect substitute 
for the lack of insurance and can help insure that the welfare of consumers and producers exceeds a 
certain minimum threshold. But as Eaton and Grossman (1985) note, tariffs do not constitute a first-
best solution to the problem of income redistribution; for example, an income tax can redistribute 
income without distorting prices faced by domestic agents. 
Second, how should we conceptualize a PRS under the laws of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO)? We highlight WTO rules that require member countries to convert agricultural duties into 
ordinary customs duties and discuss why duties arising out of a PRS generally do not comply with 
such obligations. Consequently, the typical PRS regime, such as the one implemented by Peru, is 
inconsistent with WTO rules. However, we draw attention to open questions in WTO jurisprudence 
with respect to whether a PRS consistent with WTO rules could ever be designed.  
Third, if a PRS is WTO-inconsistent but a member country nevertheless wishes to preserve its 
flexibility to employ this instrument, can it do so through a preferential trade agreement? To what 
extent can such agreements serve as a work-around solution to existing WTO rules? And what 
                                                     
1
 Panel Report, Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, WT/DS457/R, 27 Nov. 2014 
[hereinafter ‘Panel Report’]. Note that this Article is focused exclusively on the Panel Report in the dispute, as this was 
the scope asked of the authors for the 2014 WTO case law review analysis. The Appellate Body report was subsequently 
issued on 20 July 2015 and adopted on 31 July 2015. 
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significance, if any, should be attached to the signing of such agreements as opposed to their actual 
ratification? We examine a series of questions that arise out of Peru’s Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) 
concerning the relationship between WTO obligations and subsequent FTA provisions. In general, 
these raise concerns over whether WTO rights can be traded away through FTAs, so as to allow for a 
PRS to remain in place and unchallenged, even if the PRS violates WTO rules.  
The rest of this article is organized as follows: Using Peru as an example, section 2 describes how a 
PRS is typically employed by a developing country. This section also provides some background 
regarding the resulting WTO dispute between Guatemala and Peru that arose as a result of Peru’s PRS. 
Section 3 then assesses the economic implications of Peru’s PRS. Section 4 examines the Panel’s legal 
rulings concerning the PRS’s consistency with Peru’s WTO commitments in the Agreement on 
Agriculture. Finally, Section 5 assesses the question of whether the fact that a PRS that has been 
agreed to in a FTA between two WTO members has any bearing on a WTO dispute between the same 
members. 
2. Background 
Recent studies have demonstrated that the economic impact of agricultural trade liberalization varies 
both within and across developing countries, with outcomes dependent on the country’s factor 
endowments and the precise contours of liberalization (Bouet et al., 2005). Not all agents in 
developing countries necessarily gain from liberalizing trade in agriculture. As a result, some countries 
might choose to impose policies designed to safeguard certain groups against any potential negative 
impacts resulting from increased foreign exposure.  
We examine measures taken by the Peruvian government in the early 2000s as a case study of how 
a developing country might utilize a PRS to advance its policy objective. We then highlight how such 
an instrument might give rise to trade tensions with other developing countries that are agricultural 
exporters. 
2.1 The Development of Peru’s Price Range System 
During the 1990s, the Peruvian economy underwent a massive program of structural adjustment and 
economic liberalization. As part of this program, and in conjunction with Uruguay Round 
commitments, Peru lowered its tariffs and other trade barriers on agriculture products (Trivelli 2003: 
5). Peru consolidated its agricultural tariff bindings at 30 percent for most agricultural commodities; a 
few products, such as butter, wheat, and milk, were bound at 68 percent instead.
2
 
In addition to this customs duty, Peru also imposed an additional duty on specific agricultural 
products. These include 45 agricultural products at the HS-10 tariff line level, which are separated into 
four general categories: milk, yellow maize, rice, and sugar.
3
 These are set forth in Supreme Decree 
No. 115-2001-EF, published on 22 June 2001. Within each category, there is one tariff line designated 
as the “marker” product and all others are designated as “associated” products. 
  
                                                     
2
 Peru’s full schedule of tariff commitments can be found at the WTO’s Tariff Analysis Online facility. The Peruvian 
government’s decision to adopt a uniform tariff rate for most agricultural commodities is one that was also implemented 
by a number of other Latin American governments. See Ingco (2006) for more details.  
3
 For a complete list of these tariff lines, see Panel Report, para. 7.121. 
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The PRS established by the Supreme Decree operated as follows:  
 Within each category, there was one tariff line designated as the “marker” product and all others 
are designated as “associated” products. 
 A floor and ceiling price were determined for each marker product on the basis of monthly 
average f.o.b. (freight on board) prices for the past 60 months on the international reference 
market for that marker product. These prices were to be updated semi-annually and converted to 
a c.i.f. (cost, insurance and freight) floor and ceiling prices.
4
 
 In addition, a reference price was to be calculated every two weeks, reflecting the average 
international market price for the product.
5
 
 The reference price was then compared to the c.i.f. floor and ceiling prices to determine whether 
a “variable additional duty” should be levied or a “tariff rebate” should be issued. 
Whenever the international reference price (denoted by p
R
) fell below the c.i.f. floor price 𝑝, a 
“variable additional duty” was levied against the imported good. Letting b denote the import costs 
associated with marker products, the additional variable duty 𝐴𝐷 was calculated according to the 
following formula: 
 
𝐴𝐷 =  (1 +  𝑏) (𝑝– 𝑝𝑅) 
Assuming that the additional cost associated with the variable additional duty was passed on to the 
consumer, this policy kept Peruvian prices for the good above world market prices. It therefore 
protected Peruvian farmers from negative price shocks on the global market. 
In contrast, whenever the reference price rose above the c.i.f. ceiling price 𝑝, a tariff rebate was 
issued to the importer. The tariff rebate was calculated as follows: 
 
𝑇𝑅 =  (1 +  𝑏) (𝑝𝑅 − 𝑝) 
Assuming that the tariff rebate was passed on to the consumer, this policy kept Peruvian prices for the 
good below world market prices. It therefore served to protect Peruvian consumers from undesired 
price increases on the global market.  
The stated objectives of the Peruvian PRS were three-fold
6
: 
First, the PRS was designed to counter the adverse effects to domestic agricultural production on 
account of “distortions . . . due, in particular, to the agricultural policies implemented by the main food 
producing and exporting countries” and as “reflected in the uncertainty and instability of domestic 
prices”; 
Second, the PRS was “a stabilization and protection mechanism that makes it possible to neutralize 
the fluctuations of international prices and limit the negative effects of the fall in those prices”; and 
Third, the PRS constituted “an appropriate means of improving the levels of competitiveness of 
domestic producers, by giving the market clear signals with regard to trends in prices, thereby 
allowing economic agents to operate efficiently and productively . . . .” 
As suggested then, a PRS, similar to a price band, can operate as an instrument for small open 
economies to guard against both types of undesired price fluctuations associated with increased 
agricultural trade liberalization. Indeed, the Peruvian Ministry of Economy and Finance described the 
                                                     
4
 Ibid., paras. 7.127-7.135. 
5
 Ibid., paras. 7.136-7.139. 
6
 Ibid., para. 7.118. 
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PRS exactly as such. The Ministry’s website noted that the PRS is intended to protect both domestic 
producers and consumers, through establishment of a floor and ceiling prices for calculating a variable 
additional duty or tariff rebate, as necessary, to fulfill its various stabilization and competitiveness 
objectives.
7
  
2.2 The WTO Dispute and the Guatemala–Peru FTA 
On 12 April 2013, Guatemala filed a request for consultations with Peru, alleging that Peru’s PRS 
violate several WTO commitments.
8
 These include: 
 Article 4.2 and footnote 1 of the Agreement on Agriculture, to the extent that the additional duty 
constitutes and encompasses elements of a variable import levy, a minimum import price, or a 
measure similar to the two; 
 Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994, since the measure constitutes a duty or charge other than an 
ordinary customs duty that was not included in Peru’s schedule of concessions;  
 Article X:1 and X:3(a) of the GATT 1994, regarding failures in the publication and 
administration of the trade regulations related to the PRS. 
Should the Panel find that the duties arising from the PRS are ordinary customs duties, Guatemala 
argued, in the alternative, that Peru’s actions would then amount to a violation of Articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 
and 7 of the Customs Valuation Agreement.  
What is of particular interest in this dispute is the fact that Guatemala and Peru earlier had 
negotiated a FTA, signed on 6 December 2011. The FTA included a provision, Article 9 of Annex 2.3, 
in which Guatemala explicitly recognizes Peru’s right to maintain a PRS. The provision states: “Peru 
may maintain its Price Range System, established in Supreme Decree No. 1152001EF and the 
amendments thereto, with regard to the products subject to the application of the system marked with 
an asterisk (*) in column 4 of Peru’s Schedule as set out in this Annex.”9 The FTA also clarified that 
in the event of an inconsistency between the FTA and WTO agreements, the FTA “shall prevail to the 
extent of the inconsistency, unless otherwise provided in this Treaty.”10  
Why did Guatemala go ahead to challenge the PRS through WTO dispute settlement, when it had 
explicitly recognized Peru’s right to maintain the PRS in a bilateral FTA? At the time that the 
complaint was filed, the FTA had not been ratified by either party. Thus, due to the incomplete 
ratification of the FTA, Guatemala perhaps did not consider itself bound by the FTA’s obligations. 
The two sides met through formal consultations on 14-15 May 2013, but failed to resolve the 
dispute.
11
 Guatemala then proceeded to request a Panel on 14 June 2013.
12
 Eleven WTO members 
reserved their right to participate as third parties to the dispute.
13
 
Prior to the Panel’s establishment, on 4 July 2013, Guatemala’s Congress approved the FTA.14 In 
September 2013, the Panel for the dispute was composed. In December 2013, Guatemala initiated the 
                                                     
7
 Ibid., para. 7.119. 
8
 Request for Consultations by Guatemala, Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, 
WT/DS457/1, G/AG/GEN/109, G/VAL/D/12, G/L/1024, 16 April 2013 [hereinafter ‘WT/DS457/1’] 
9
 Tratado de Libre Comercio Guatemala-Perú [Guatemala-Peru Free Trade Agreement], signed 6 Dec. 2011, art. 9 of 
Annex 2.3. 
10
 Ibid., art. 1.3 of Annex 2.3. 
11
 Request for Establishment of a Panel by Guatemala, WT/DS457/2, 14 June 2013. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 The eleven WTO members were: Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, the European Union, 
Honduras, India, South Korea, and the United States. See Panel Report, para. 1.6. 
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procedures for ratification of the FTA, with Peru receiving a communication on 5 March 2014 that 
Guatemala had fulfilled the legal requirements for entry into force of the FTA.
15
  
Ratification of the FTA in Peru did not require the President obtain prior approval from Congress.
16
 
For the FTA to have entered into force, the President could simply have initiated the proper 
procedures for ratification. However, Peru’s President chose not to do so because it viewed the filing 
of the WTO dispute as having “created uncertainty with regard to the existence of the balance 
negotiated” in the FTA.17 Peru nevertheless did not rule out the possibility of expressing consent to be 
bound by the FTA “provided that the balance agreed between Peru and Guatemala therein is 
respected.”18 It simply kept ratification at a standstill, pending the WTO dispute. Thus, the bilateral 
FTA, as of this writing, has not yet entered into force. 
On 27 November 2014, the Panel issued a report finding Peru to have violated Article 4.2 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture because the duties arising from the PRS constitute a variable import levy 
that was not permissible under the Agreement.
19
 In addition, the Panel also ruled that the duties arising 
from the PRS violated GATT Article II:1(b) because they were not ordinary customs duties and were 
not declared as other duties or charges.
20
 The Panel exercised judicial economy with respect to the 
GATT Article X:1 and X:3(a) claims.
21
 Finally, the Panel did not find it necessary to rule on Peru’s 
argument that the FTA modified the rights between the two parties with respect to the PRS, resulting 
in Guatemala’s waiver of its WTO rights concerning the PRS; the Panel emphasized that the FTA had 
not yet entered into force and therefore its provisions were not legally binding.
22
  
Both Peru and Guatemala filed a notice of appeal to the Appellate Body concerning particular 
elements of the Panel decision. The Appellate Body ruling, issued on 20 July 2015, largely upheld the 
Panel’s rulings except with respect to the Panel’s ruling concerning the similarity of the PRS to a 
“minimum import price” within the meaning of the Agreement on Agriculture.23 This article, however, 
concerns itself exclusively with the Panel ruling.
24
 
In order to better understand what was at stake in this dispute, it is useful to begin with an overview 
of trade between the two parties. 
2.3 Patterns of Trade Between Guatemala and Peru 
Why would Guatemala bother to marshal the resources to file a WTO complaint against Peru’s PRS? 
When viewed from an aggregate economic perspective, this dispute appear to be bit of a puzzle since 
it essentially involves two small economies that do not trade a great deal with each other. In 2013, 
when measured in PPP terms, the Peruvian economy constituted only 0.35% of the world economy 
and 3.88% of the Latin American economy. Peru's share of world imports equaled a tiny 0.22% in 
2013. Similarly, Guatemala accounted for 0.11% of world GDP in PPP terms; 1.22% of Latin 
(Contd.)                                                                  
14
 Ibid., para. 7.32. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Ibid., para. 7.33. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Ibid., paras. 7.352 & 7.371-7.372. 
20
 Ibid., paras. 7.425-7.432. 
21
 Ibid., paras. 7.467 & 7.501. 
22
 Ibid., paras. 7.525-7.528. 
23
 Appellate Body Report, Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, WT/DS457/AB/R, 20 July 
2015 [hereinafter ‘Appellate Body Report’]. 
24
 Note that this was the scope asked of the authors for the 2014 WTO case law analysis. 
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American GDP; and a miniscule 0.05% of world exports. The picture is rather similar from a bilateral 
trade perspective: only 0.07% of Peru's total imports were sourced from Guatemala while 0.30% of 
Guatemala's total exports went to Peru.
25
 Thus, it is patently clear that, from an aggregate trade 
perspective, neither is Guatemala an important source of imports for Peru and nor is Peru a major 
destination market for Guatemalan exporters. 
How large is trade in the relevant commodities between the two countries? Unfortunately, the poor 
quality of product level bilateral trade data between Peru and Guatemala does not allow us to answer 
this question with a great degree of precision. The dispute covered 45 products at the 10-digit HS 
level: 4 varieties of rice, 10 types of maize, 23 milk related products, and 6 products derived from 
sugar.
26
 However, data were available only at the 6-digit HS level and as per the WITS data-set, there 
was significant trade among the two countries in only two products: cane sugar (HS 170111) and other 
cane and beet sugar (HS 170199).
27
 Nevertheless, whatever data were available from the World Bank's 
data-set WITS regarding Peruvian imports of the relevant commodities from various countries are 
presented in Tables 1A and 1B.
28
 
  
                                                     
25
 During 2013, the US and China were the two most important sources of imports for Peru, accounting for 20.3% and 
19.4% of total Peruvian imports respectively. Brazil and Ecuador were the next two largest suppliers to Peru. Their shares 
however, were smaller and equaled 5.4% and 4.5% respectively. On the export side, in 2013, Peru's top five export 
partners were US, China, Switzerland, Canada and Japan. In particular, the value shares of Peru's exports to US and 
China were as high as 17.8% and 17.6% respectively. Moreover, the top five export partners accounted for roughly 54% 
of Peru's exports. 
26
 For each product category, there was a single marker product upon which the international reference price was chosen to 
calculate the band for the PRS. 
27
 Indeed, the low level of bilateral trade between Peru and Guatemala maybe one reason why the data are of poor quality. 
28
 We thank Chad Bown for providing us with the data and Semira Ahdiyyih for excellent research assistance. 
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Table 1A: Peru’s imports of HMS 170111 (Cane Sugar), current $, thousands 
  
1998 Guatemala 
20083.46 (71.9%) 
Bolivia 
3655.23  
(13.1%) 
Colombia 
2760.5 (9.9%) 
Mexico 
1411.94  
(5.1%) 
World 
27941.05 
(100%) 
1999 Guatemala 
0 
(0%) 
Colombia 
267.635 
(78.7%) 
Brazil 
68.742 
(20.2%) 
USA 
2.212 
(0.6%) 
World 
339.866 
(100%) 
2000 Guatemala 
0 
(0%) 
Colombia 
151.016 
(99.0%) 
USA 
0.593 
(0.3%) 
Hong Kong 
0.508 
(0.3%) 
World 
152.584 
(100%) 
2001 Guatemala 
0 
(0%) 
Colombia 
2425.465 
(78.3%) 
Bolivia 
668.27 
(21.6%) 
UK 
1.51 
(0.0%) 
World 
3096.469 
(100%) 
2002 Guatemala 
0 
(0%) 
Colombia 
557.054 
(60.6%) 
Bolivia 
331.355 
(36.0%) 
USA 
29.085 
(3.1%) 
World 
918.861 
(100%) 
2003 Guatemala 
0 
(0%) 
USA 
3.376 
(57.9%) 
Italy 
0.587 
(10.1%) 
Hong Kong 
0.462 
(7.9%) 
World 
5.828 
(100%) 
2004 Guatemala 
0 
(0%) 
Bolivia 
1547.17 
(52.6%) 
Colombia 
1387.96 
(47.2%) 
UK 
1.015 
(0.0%) 
World 
2936.543 
(100%) 
2005 Guatemala 
479.825 
(4.6%) 
Colombia 
8642.85 
(83.6%) 
Bolivia 
1207.991 
(11.6%) 
Belgium 
17.816 
(0.1%) 
World 
10348.812 
(100%) 
2006 Guatemala 
3315.398 
(30.0%) 
Colombia 
6551.091 
(49.3%) 
Nicaragua 
1949.581 
(14.7%) 
Bolivia 
645.626 
(4.9%) 
World 
13281.523 
(100%) 
2007 Guatemala 
1338.976 
(17.0%) 
Colombia 
4501.341 
(57.3%) 
Nicaragua 
1214.512 
(15.7%) 
Bolivia 
767.618 
(9.7%) 
World 
7853.985 
(100%) 
2008 Guatemala 
0 
(0%) 
Colombia 
813.955 
(86.1%) 
Bolivia 
76.992 
(8.1%) 
Paraguay 
21.075 
(2.2%) 
World 
944.998 
(100%) 
2009 Guatemala 
0 
(0%) 
Bolivia 
2545.896 
(72.5%) 
Colombia 
911.968 
(26.0%) 
Paraguay 
33.894 
(0.9%) 
World 
3511.172 
(100%) 
2010 Guatemala 
0 
(0%) 
Brazil 
4385.985 
(78.6%) 
Colombia 
827.096 
(14.9%) 
Bolivia 
246.82 
(4.4%) 
World 
5577.88 
(100%) 
2011 Guatemala 
0 
(0%) 
Colombia 
2383.222 
(87.7%) 
Paraguay 
215.422 
(7.9%) 
Chile 
43.988 
(1.6%) 
World 
2718.68 
(100%) 
2012 Guatemala 
8927.789 
(25.5%) 
Colombia 
17723.094 
(50.7%) 
Nicaragua 
4492.297 
(12.8%) 
Honduras 
2668.393 
(7.6%) 
World 
34983.071 
(100%) 
2013 Guatemala 
441.866 
(26.2%) 
Colombia 
697.898 
(41.3%) 
Paraguay 
460.101 
(27.3%) 
Bolivia 
58.392 
(3.4%) 
World 
1687.901 
(100%) 
Note that in 13 observations of the 34 available for all relevant products (i.e. over 1/3rd of the time) 
Guatemala appears in the list of the top three exporters (noted in bold font) to Peru. Perhaps most 
noteworthy is the fact that in 1998 Guatemala was the world's largest exporter of cane sugar (HS 
170111) to Peru. Furthermore, Table 1A shows that during 2007-2013, Guatemala accounted for a 
significant share of total Peruvian imports of cane sugar: this share was 17.0% in 2007, 25.5% in 
2012, and 26.2% in 2013. 
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Table 1B: Peru’s imports of HMS 170199 (Other Cane or Beet Sugar), current $, thousands 
  
1998 Guatemala 
32366.3 
(25.0%) 
Brazil 
25313.8 
(19.5%) 
Colombia 
23570.81 
(18.1%) 
Bolivia 
14514.83 
(11.2%) 
World 
129604.544 
(100%) 
1999 Guatemala 
8109.546 
(9.6%) 
Colombia 
38027.705 
(45.1%) 
Brazil 
13336.173 
(15.8%) 
Ecuador 
9505.746 
(11.2%) 
World 
84315.545 
(100%) 
2000 Guatemala 
3656.519 
(7.9%) 
Colombia 
24227.232 
(52.6%) 
Brazil 
5978.214 
(13.0%) 
Mexico 
4935.809 
(10.7%) 
World 
46074.408 
(100%) 
2001 Guatemala 
6615.852 
(12.4%) 
Colombia 
28564.382 
(53.6%) 
Ecuador 
6603.171 
(12.4%) 
Bolivia 
4654.843 
(8.7%) 
World 
53288.648 
(100%) 
2002 Guatemala 
6362.536 
(18.9%) 
Colombia 
19895.43 
(59.0%) 
Bolivia 
3353.046 
(9.9%) 
Brazil 
3223.715 
(9.8%) 
World 
33709.985 
(100%) 
2003 Guatemala 
0 
(0%) 
Bolivia 
1665.081 
(56.1%) 
France 
33.526 
(1.1%) 
USA 
6.748 
(0.2%) 
World 
2963.453 
(100%) 
2004 Guatemala 
88.744 
(0.1%) 
Ecuador 
18282.151 
(38.8%) 
Bolivia 
15238.501 
(32.3%) 
Colombia 
10953.238 
(23.2%) 
World 
47119.314 
(100%) 
2005 Guatemala 
892.475 
(1.4%) 
Colombia 
33787.116 
(52.8%) 
Bolivia 
12792.212 
(20.0%) 
Ecuador 
12311.754 
(19.2%) 
World 
64000.128 
(100%) 
2006 Guatemala 
6780.931 
(7.2%) 
Colombia 
54332.902 
(58.2%) 
Brazil 
13814.809 
(14.8%) 
Bolivia 
10654.803 
(11.4%) 
World 
93388.238 
(100%) 
2007 Guatemala 
6077.705 
(7.3%) 
Colombia 
54160.209 
(65.3%) 
Bolivia 
14467.328 
(17.5%) 
Brazil 
4473.966 
(5.3%) 
World 
82860.16 
(100%) 
2008 Guatemala 
9576.184 
(12.2%) 
Colombia 
39292.018 
(49.9%) 
Bolivia 
16554.384 
(21.0%) 
Brazil 
5683.314 
(7.2%) 
World 
78677.457 
(100%) 
2009 Guatemala 
628.575 
(1.0%) 
Colombia 
35222.83 
(59.6%) 
Bolivia 
18164.825 
(30.7%) 
Brazil 
4489.098 
(7.6%) 
World 
59174.148 
(100%) 
2010 Guatemala 
36476.885 
(29.2%) 
Colombia 
59457.925 
(47.6%) 
Brazil 
18032.946 
(14.5%) 
Bolivia 
8874.507 
(7.1%) 
World 
124713.045 
(100%) 
2011 Guatemala 
39082.165 
(27.7%) 
Colombia 
66986.108 
(47.4%) 
Brazil 
33027.344 
(23.4%) 
Honduras 
1373.289 
(0.9%) 
World 
141246.373 
(100%) 
2012 Guatemala 
32076.767 
(19.5%) 
Colombia 
93761.102 
(57.0%) 
Brazil 
23589.2 
(14.3%) 
Bolivia 
8351.341 
(0.5%) 
World 
164666.979 
(100%) 
2013 Guatemala 
1100.403 
(1.3%) 
Colombia 
67349.734 
(82.9%) 
Bolivia 
5073.969 
(6.2%) 
Brazil 
4104.905 
(5.0%) 
World 
81209.131 
(100%) 
Table 1B shows that a similar pattern holds for "other cane and beet sugar" (HS 170199): Guatemala 
exported "other cane and beet sugar" to Peru throughout 2007-2013, and ranked among the top three 
exporters in all years except 2009 and 2013. Excluding 2009 and 2013, the share of Peruvian imports 
of "other cane and beet sugar" sourced from Guatemala ranged between 10% and 30%. Finally, one 
may worry that these import data may understate Guatemala's potential exports to Peru in the relevant 
commodities since these were subject to the duties imposed under the PRS. To measure the real 
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importance of Peru's market for the relevant commodities from the viewpoint of Guatemalan 
exporters, we would need to know what their exports to Peru would have been had no PRS been 
instituted by Peru. However, since Peru’s PRS applied to all foreign exporters and not just Guatemala, 
the PRS is likely to have reduced Peruvian imports from all sources so that the export shares of 
various countries reported in Tables 1A and 1B are likely to paint a fairly accurate picture. We also 
examined Guatemala’s exports in these two commodities and found that over 1998-2013, only in one 
year did Peru absorb more than 5% of Guatemalan exports for either of these commodities (i.e. those 
of cane sugar in 1998 when roughly 14.42% of Guatemalan exports went to Peru).  
The takeaway from these facts is that while Peru is not an important destination market for 
Guatemalan exports, Guatemala is a reasonably important supplier of a few commodities relevant to 
the dispute. Nevertheless, even in these products, trade between Peru and Guatemala constitutes such a 
small part of the global market that the world price of these products is likely to be unaffected by their 
trade policies. Thus, in the jargon of economics, this case is best viewed as a dispute involving two 
"small" countries, i.e., countries that are incapable of affecting their terms of trade with respect to the 
world.
29
 
Armed with this motivation, below we construct a simple economic model to analyze the economic 
effects of a PRS on a small open economy. 
3. The Economic Impact of a PRS on a Small Open Economy 
Why would a small economy, such as Peru, so adamantly seek to preserve its right to impose a PRS? 
In the introduction above, we discussed two political reasons why a government might choose to 
implement the PRS – as a price stabilization policy for farmers to guard against the negative income 
effects of price shocks and as a price stabilization policy for consumers to guard against price 
increases. But what if a PRS is evaluated on the basis of aggregate economic welfare as opposed to the 
welfare of individual groups? Does a PRS enhance a country’s overall economic welfare?  
Below, we provide a formal analysis of the effects of a PRS in the standard trade model of a small 
importing nation. Since this analysis raises questions about the optimality of a PRS, we next discuss 
some modifications in the underlying assumptions of the standard model that can help explain why a 
small importing country might want to institute a PRS. 
3.1 A Stylized Model of a Small Importing Nation 
Suppose Peru institutes a PRS under which it adjusts the additional duty applied to an imported 
commodity (call it sugar) to ensure that the domestic (tariff-ridden) price always lies within the 
interval [𝑝, 𝑝]. Let the world price 𝑝𝑤 of sugar fluctuate between three different states.30 In the high 
state (𝑖 =  𝐻) 𝑝𝑤 = 𝑝𝐻; in the medium state (𝑖 =  𝑀) 𝑝
𝑤 = 𝑝𝑀; and in the low state (𝑖 =  𝐿) 
𝑝𝑤 = 𝑝𝐿, where the following relationships hold (i) 𝑝𝐻 ≥ 𝑝𝑀 ≥ 𝑝𝐿; (ii) 𝑝𝐻 > 𝑝; (iii) 𝑝𝑀 ∈ [𝑝, 𝑝] and 
                                                     
29
 In the presence of some frictions, such as sunk costs of accessing markets and reorienting exports, it is conceivable that 
Peru's trade policies could affect Guatemala's terms of trade. If Guatemalan exporters have made irreversible investments 
in order to export to Peru, they may be willing to accept a relatively lower price in Peru's market in order to avoid having 
to undertake similar investments in other markets. However, the role of such irreversible investments in context of 
agricultural commodities such as sugar seems rather unclear since they tend to be relatively homogenous and their sale 
may not require much investment in the way of marketing and distribution. 
30
 In what follows we assume that the international reference price equals the world price. This helps simplify exposition 
without materially affecting our main conclusions. One added benefit of this normalization is that it makes a PRS 
equivalent to a price band system. Furthermore, since the import cost parameter b does not affect the working of the 
model, we set it equal to zero. 
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(iv) 𝑝𝐿 < 𝑝. Thus, by design, the high price 𝑝𝐻 exceeds the upper bound 𝑝 of the PRS, the low price 
𝑝𝐿 lies below the lower bound 𝑝 while the medium price 𝑝𝑀 lies strictly inside the interval [𝑝, 𝑝]. 
Let θ𝑖 denote the probability of state 𝑖 so that we have 
 
 
𝑝𝑤  = {
𝑝𝐿 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏 θ𝐿
𝑝𝑀 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏 θ𝑀
𝑝𝐻 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏 θ𝐻 = 1 − θ𝐿 − θ𝑀
 
 
(1) 
Let 𝐴𝐷𝑖 denote the additional duty applied by Peru in state 𝑖. Then, the variable duty imposed by Peru 
under its PRS is given by 
 
𝐴𝐷 = {
𝐴𝐷𝐿 =  𝑝 − 𝑝L 𝑖𝑓 𝑝
𝑤 =  𝑝L
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑤 =  𝑝M
𝐴𝐷𝐻 =  𝑝 − 𝑝H 𝑖𝑓 𝑝
𝑤 =  𝑝H
 
 
(2) 
Observe that 𝐴𝐷𝐻 < 0 < 𝐴𝐷𝐿: i.e. the variable levy is positive when the world price is low 
whereas it is negative when it is high. Finally, when the world price falls within the price band [𝑝, 𝑝] 
established by the PRS, the additional duty imposed by Peru equals zero.
31
 
Treating Peru as a small open economy (i.e. as a country that takes world prices as given), the 
domestic (tariff-included) price in Peru under various states of the world is simply the sum of the 
world price and the duty applied: 
 
 
𝑝 = {
𝑝𝐿 +  𝐴𝐷𝐿 = 𝑝 𝑖𝑓 𝑝
𝑤 =  𝑝𝐿
𝑝M 𝑖𝑓 𝑝
𝑤 =  𝑝M
𝑝𝐻 +  𝐴𝐷𝐻 = 𝑝 𝑖𝑓 𝑝
𝑤 =  𝑝𝐻
 
 
(3) 
Thus, by design, the variable duty imposed ensures that the domestic price always stays within the 
PRS band [𝑝, 𝑝]. 
Let domestic (inverse) demand function in Peru for sugar be given by 
 
 𝑑(𝑝) = 𝑎 −  𝑝 (4) 
and the domestic supply function by  
 
 𝑠(𝑝) =  𝑝 (5) 
Then, Peru's import demand curve for sugar is the difference between domestic demand and supply: 
 
 𝑚(𝑝) = 𝑑(𝑝) − 𝑠(𝑝) =  𝑎 −  2𝑝 (6) 
In the absence of trade, we would have 𝑚(𝑝) = 0 which yields 𝑝∗ = 𝑎/2 as the autarkic equilibrium 
price in Peru. Given the nature of the dispute, we assume 𝑚(𝑝𝑖) > 0 i.e. Peru imports the good under 
all states of the world, an outcome that is guaranteed by the inequality 𝑝𝐻 < 𝑝∗, which we assume 
holds. 
                                                     
31
 We should note here that in addition to the PRS, Peru also imposed a baseline tariff on the relevant commodities. 
However, since this fixed tariff level does not play an important role in determining the economic effects of the PRS, our 
model abstracts from it by setting it equal to zero. 
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Given a domestic price 𝑝, the surplus consumers enjoy from the good equals 
 
 
𝐶𝑆 = ∫(𝑎 − 𝑝)𝑑𝑝 =
1
2
𝑎
𝑝
(𝑎 − 𝑝)2 
 
(7) 
so that expected consumer welfare can be written as 
 
 𝐸𝐶𝑆 = ∑ 𝜃𝑖
𝑖
𝐶𝑆(𝑝𝑖) 
(8) 
Similarly, the surplus of domestic producers equals 
 
𝑃𝑆 = ∫ 𝑝𝑑𝑝 =
1
2
𝑝2
𝑝
0
 
 
(9) 
which gives expected producer surplus as 
 
 𝐸𝑃𝑆 = ∑ 𝜃𝑖
𝑖
𝑃𝑆(𝑝𝑖) 
(10) 
The tariff revenue collected by Peru under each state of the world equals 
 
 
𝑇𝑅 = {
 𝑡𝐿𝑚(𝑝) = (𝑝 − 𝑝𝐿)𝑚(𝑝) 𝑖𝑓 𝑝
𝑤 =  𝑝𝐿
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑤 =  𝑝M
 𝑡𝐻𝑚(𝑝) = −(𝑝𝐻 − 𝑝)𝑚(𝑝) 𝑖𝑓 𝑝
𝑤 =  𝑝𝐻
 
 
 
(11) 
which yields expected tariff revenue as 
 
 𝐸𝑇𝑅 = 𝜃𝐿(𝑝 − 𝑝𝐿)𝑚(𝑝) − 𝜃𝐻(𝑝𝐻 − 𝑝)𝑚(𝑝) (12) 
We can now write down Peru's expected total welfare under the PRS as a weighted sum of consumer 
surplus, producer surplus, and tariff revenue: 
 
 𝐸𝑊 = ∑ 𝜃𝑖
𝑖
[𝐶𝑆(𝑝𝑖) + 𝜆𝑃𝑆(𝑝𝑖)] + 𝜆[𝜃𝐿(𝑝 − 𝑝𝐿)𝑚(𝑝) − 𝜃𝐻(𝑝𝐻 − 𝑝)𝑚(𝑝)] 
(13) 
where the parameter λ ≥ 1 measures how much extra weight the government puts on producer 
interests and tariff revenue relative to consumer surplus. When λ = 1, the government weights all 
components of welfare equally and as λ increases, the relative weight placed on consumer welfare 
declines while that placed on other components increases. 
Using the formulae in (6) through (13) we can directly calculate 
 
 𝜕𝐸𝑊
𝜕𝑝
|𝜆=1 = −2𝜃𝐿 (𝑝 − 𝑝𝐿) < 0 
(14) 
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i.e. if the government weights all components of welfare equally (λ=1), then it is optimal to reduce the 
lower bound of the PRS to its minimum possible value. This implies that it is optimal for Peru not 
impose any minimum price on the commodity. Similarly, we have 
 
 𝜕𝐸𝑊
𝜕𝑝
|𝜆=1 = 2𝜃𝐻(𝑝𝐻 − 𝑝) > 0 
(15) 
i.e. it is optimal for Peru to raise the upper bound of the PRS band. It is worth emphasizing equations 
(14) and (15) imply that in the standard trade model it is optimal for a small importing nation to allow 
maximum variability in its local price if its objective is to maximize expected national welfare. 
Thus, in the canonical trade model of a small open economy, the mere presence of price 
fluctuations does not generate a welfare based rationale for the use of a PRS like the one employed by 
Peru so long as the objective of the government is to maximize expected aggregate welfare. The 
intuition for this result is that the gains from trade enjoyed by an open economy depend upon whether 
and how much the world price of a commodity differs from its autarkic price. In our simple model 
above, the autarkic price equals 𝑝∗ = 𝑎/2. Imagine the world price equals Peru's autarkic price, i.e. 
𝑝𝑤 = 𝑝∗ = 𝑎/2. Would it gain from trade? The answer is a clear no since domestic production and 
consumption under free trade would exactly equal that under autarky. Now, consistent with the 
dispute, suppose 𝑝𝑤 < 𝑝∗. Then, under free trade, Peru would import this commodity and enjoy gains 
from trade. While domestic producers would lose, the increase in consumer surplus would dominate 
their loss. Indeed, the lower the world price relative to Peru's autarkic price, the larger would be its 
gains from trade. A PRS band supported by fluctuating duties reduces the extent to which the domestic 
price in Peru differs from its autarkic price and therefore reduces its overall gains from trade. 
The careful reader may observe that the above discussion seems to ignore the fact that the duties 
applied raise revenue. While revenue is part of domestic welfare, for the case of a small open 
economy, the burden of an import duty is borne entirely by local consumers - see the formula for the 
domestic price in (3). As a result, from an aggregate welfare perspective, the variable duty system 
instituted to support the PRS simply redistributes income within Peru. When 𝑝𝑤 = 𝑝𝐿 , the duty 𝑡𝐿 
raises the domestic price in Peru to 𝑝 and redistributes income from consumers to producers and the 
government; whereas when 𝑝𝑤 = 𝑝𝐻, the rebate 𝑡𝐻 benefits local consumers at the expense of the 
other two groups by lowering the domestic price to 𝑝. 
Figure 1 in the appendix provides a graphical illustration of why the expected welfare of a small 
importing nation declines when it puts in place a PRS to lower domestic price variability. When 
𝑝𝑤 = 𝑝𝐿, the duty 𝑡𝐿 raises the domestic price to the minimum acceptable price 𝑝 and consumer 
surplus declines by the amount 𝑈 + 𝑉 + 𝑊 + 𝑋. Domestic producer surplus increases by 𝑈 and 
government collects revenue equal to area 𝑊. The net welfare loss suffered by Peru when 𝑝𝑤 = 𝑝𝐿 
then equals 𝑈 + 𝑊 − (𝑈 + 𝑉 + 𝑊 + 𝑋) = −𝑉 − 𝑋, which is simply the deadweight loss of the duty 
𝑡𝐿. Now consider the case where 𝑝
𝑤 = 𝑝𝐻 so that the rebate 𝑡𝐻 lowers the local price to 𝑝. Then, when 
𝑝𝑤 = 𝑝𝐻 consumers gain the area 𝐴 + 𝐵 + 𝐶 + 𝐷 + 𝐸 due to the rebate that lowers the domestic price 
to 𝑝; producers lose 𝐴 + 𝐵; while the government loses 𝐵 + 𝐶 + 𝐷 + 𝐸 + 𝐹 in order to cover the 
subsidy payments needed to lower the local price to 𝑝. Adding these gains and losses together, we find 
that the net welfare effect of the PRS on Peru is once again negative and it equals −(𝐵 + 𝐹). Thus, 
regardless of whether the world price is below or above the PRS interval [𝑝, 𝑝], the net welfare of a 
small importing nation declines due to the PRS. 
The above analysis has focused on the case where the government cares equally about all 
components of welfare (i.e. λ=1). In the real world, it is possible that the government weighs producer 
interests and tariff revenue more than consumer surplus. Suppose the importing government weighs 
producer interests and revenue more than consumer surplus (i.e. λ > 1). Then, the first order 
conditions 
𝜕𝐸𝑊
𝜕𝑝
= 0 and 
𝜕𝐸𝑊
𝜕𝑝
= 0 can be solved for the endpoints of the optimal PRS band. We have: 
Kamal Saggi and Mark Wu 
14 
𝑝∗ =
2𝜆𝑝𝐿 − (𝜆 − 1)𝑎
3𝜆 − 1
 
where 𝑝∗ is increasing in λ and 
 
𝑝∗ − 𝑝𝐿 =
(𝜆 − 1)(𝑎 − 𝑝𝐿)
3𝜆 − 1
 
from which it follows that 
 
𝑝∗ > 𝑝𝐿 ⟺ 𝜆 > 1 
so that it is indeed optimal for the government to impose a PRS that raises the minimum price 𝑝𝐿 to 𝑝
∗ 
if it weighs producer surplus and revenue more than consumer surplus. However, at the same time, we 
have 
𝑝∗ − 𝑝𝐻 =
(𝜆 − 1)(𝑎 − 𝑝𝐻)
3𝜆 − 1
 
i.e. if λ > 1, it is optimal for the government to also raises the maximum price 𝑝𝐻 to 𝑝
∗. In other 
words, if 𝑝∗ > 𝑝𝐿 it must also be the case that 𝑝
∗ > 𝑝𝐻. Thus, the mere presence of political economy 
pressures that cause the government to weight producer interests (and revenue) relatively more than 
consumer welfare cannot yield a PRS that raises the domestic price when the world price is low while 
also lowering it when the world price is high. Allowing for λ > 1 only causes the government to raise 
the domestic price in all states of nature so that it cannot account for a PRS that offers a rebate to local 
consumers when the world price is high. 
3.2 Some Other Relevant Economic Considerations 
Given the results yielded by the standard model of a small importing nation, it is worth asking whether 
certain modifications in the assumptions of this model can make a PRS welfare-improving. The model 
makes two important assumptions that may be suspect in the context of agricultural trade. First, it 
assumes that all agents are risk neutral. In the context of agricultural commodities, consumers as well 
as producers might be risk averse. Second, the standard model assumes that production is completely 
flexible and can be adjusted up and down seamlessly depending upon the observed world price. We 
next investigate whether altering these assumptions can provide a rationale for why a small importing 
nation might want to lower fluctuations in the domestic price via import tariffs. 
Consider first the role of risk aversion. In their analysis of Chile – Price Band System (DS 207), 
Bagwell and Sykes (2004) note that since a PRS insulates the domestic economy from price 
fluctuations it would be attractive to local producers (as well as the government) if producers care not 
only about the average or expected price but also about its volatility.
32
 The standard model of a small 
open economy presented above ignores price volatility since all agents (producers, consumers, as well 
as the government) are assumed to be risk neutral and their welfare can be evaluated in terms of their 
expected payoffs. 
Indeed, greater price variability is actually beneficial in the standard model because it increases a 
country's expected gains from trade by causing the world price to diverge more from its autarkic price. 
If risk-averse producers are willing to sacrifice high price episodes in to order to avoid low price ones, 
a PRS can be optimal from a domestic viewpoint. However, since a PRS suppresses the overall 
                                                     
32
 In a classic paper, Newberry and Stiglitz (1984) showed that free trade can be Pareto inferior to autarky (i.e. the absence 
of trade) when neither producers nor consumers can buy insurance for the risks (i.e. the variability of output and price) 
that are faced by them. 
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expected gains from trade, for a PRS to increase welfare the benefits of reduced price variability 
would need to be sufficiently large – i.e. a small amount of risk aversion on the part of local producers 
will generally not be enough to overcome the lower expected gains from trade implied by reduced 
price variability under a PRS.
33
 
A well-established strand of the rather extensive literature on price stabilization measures argues 
that to identify the full impact of such measures one needs to examine their effect on not just the 
country instituting the system but also the rest of the world. The model presented above cannot capture 
such external effects since, by definition, a small country has no impact on the rest of the world. But as 
Bagwell and Sykes (2004) note, a PRS may simultaneously amplify fluctuations in the net price 
received by foreign exporters. Thus, for a PRS to be optimal from a joint welfare perspective domestic 
producers would need to be more risk averse than foreign exporters so that shifting risk abroad would 
be efficient. Bigman (1987) considers a two-country framework in which the free trade relative price 
is endogenous and shows that the use of variable levies by one country causes price instability to be 
exported from its market to that of its trading partner, on the basis of which he argues that variable 
levies can "destabilize thy neighbor". In other words, reduced variability in one country's market is 
achieved at the expense of increased variability in its trading partner's market. If this spillover leads 
the trading partner to also institute a price stabilization measure of its own then both countries can be 
worse off relative to a scenario where neither uses such measures. Indeed, price variability can even 
increase when price stabilization measures are used by both countries relative to when they are 
completely absent, thereby making such measures counter-productive –– see Devadoss (1992).34 
As Turnovsky (1974) notes, the classical argument in favor of price variability in competitive 
markets formalized by Oi (1961), Massell (1969), and Waugh (1966) rests on an important 
assumption: i.e. though producers (and consumers) face uncertainty, they make supply and demand 
decisions based upon actual prices whereas in the real world many critical production decisions need 
to be made before the resolution of price uncertainty. This is particularly true in the context of 
agricultural commodities where farmers make a variety of decisions well before actual prices for their 
crops are revealed. Thus, while the results of the simple model presented above clearly illustrate the 
benefits of price variability, they do not adequately capture the impact of uncertainty on production 
decisions. Eaton and Grossman (1985) show that free trade is not optimal for a small open economy 
facing uncertain terms of trade provided some factors of production are immobile ex-post and 
insurance markets are incomplete. In such an environment, tariff protection can serve as an incomplete 
substitute for the lack of insurance. In similar vein, a PRS like the one instituted by Peru can help 
insure that the welfare of consumers and producers does not fall below a certain minimum threshold. 
But as Eaton and Grossman (1985) note, trade policy intervention does not constitute a first-best 
solution to the problem of income redistribution; for example, an income tax is preferable because it 
can redistribute income without distorting prices faced by domestic agents. 
To summarize, although the canonical model of a small open economy suggests that a PRS is 
always welfare sub-optimal, this may not be the case once certain assumptions underlying this model 
are altered. In particular, the economic justification for a PRS in a small open economy turns on 
whether producers and/or consumers are risk averse, factors of production are immobile, and 
insurance markets are incomplete. In the presence of such factors, a PRS may prove to be welfare-
enhancing, albeit not necessarily a first-best solution.  
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 Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing that price stabilization schemes often end up lowering not just the volatility of 
domestic prices but also alter the average price level, which in turn implies that such schemes invariably transfer income 
between domestic groups -- something that is captured rather sharply by Figure 1. 
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4. Conceptualizing a PRS in Light of the Agreement on Agriculture 
Although a PRS may prove desirable for a government to maintain under certain conditions, it is 
difficult to align with WTO obligations. The drafters of the Agreement on Agriculture sought to limit 
the types of border measures designed to restrict the volume and/or distort the price of agricultural 
imports.
35
 To that end, they decided it would be best to require that border measures and other non-
tariff barriers designed to restrict agricultural imports be converted into ordinary customs duties. This 
would increase transparency and the quantification of measures would also make it easier for trading 
partners to compare various measures and negotiate mutual reductions.
36
  
The principle is captured within Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture which states: 
“Members shall not maintain, resort to, or revert to any measures of the kind which have been required 
to be converted into ordinary customs duties, except as otherwise provided for in Article 5 and Annex 
5.” Article 4.2 includes a footnote 1 that provides an illustrative list of the types of measures that 
might violate this provision. These include “quantitative import restrictions, variable import levies, 
minimum import prices, discretionary import licensing, non-tariff measures maintained through state-
trading enterprises, voluntary export restraints, and similar border measures other than ordinary 
customs duties.”  
To date, the bulk of WTO cases interpreting Article 4.2 have concerned quantitative import 
restrictions applied against agricultural imports.
37
 The PRS, however, does not act as a quantitative 
restriction. Instead, the two types of measures that it most closely approximates are (1) a variable 
import levy, and (2) a minimum import price.
38
 These concepts have been discussed at length in only 
one WTO dispute, the Chile – Price Band System case mentioned earlier.  
Below, we analyze whether a PRS falls under either of these measures. Provided it does, it is then 
illegal under WTO rules. Besides elaborating upon the status of Peru’s PRS, we also consider whether 
a PRS designed differently might pass muster under Article 4.2.  
4.1 Variable Import Levy  
In Chile – Price Band System, the Appellate Body discussed extensively the nature of “variable import 
levies” that must be converted to an ordinary customs duty pursuant to Article 4.2 of the Agreement 
on Agriculture. The Appellate Body noted that while variability is required, it alone is not 
determinative whether a particular tariff scheme constitutes a “variable import duty.”39 It declared: 
“[A]t least one feature of ‘variable import levies’ is the fact that the measure itself – as a 
mechanism – must impose the variability of the duties. Variability is inherent in a measure if the 
measure incorporates a scheme or formula that causes and ensures that levies change automatically 
and continuously. . . . However, in our view, the presence of a formula causing automatic and 
continuous variability of duties is a necessary, but by no means a sufficient, condition for a 
particular measure to be a ‘variable import levy’ within the meaning of footnote 1. ‘Variable 
import levies’ have additional features that undermine the object and purpose of Article 4, which is 
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 Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products, 
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38
 These are also the two cited by Guatemala in its complaint. See WT/DS457/1 at p. 2. 
39
 Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System, para. 232. 
Understanding Agricultural Price Range Systems as Trade Restraints: Peru – Agricultural Products 
17 
to achieve improved market access conditions for imports of agricultural products by permitting 
only the application of ordinary customs duties. These additional features include a lack of 
transparency and a lack of predictability in the level of duties that will result from such measures. 
This lack of transparency and this lack of predictability are liable to restrict the volume of 
imports. . . . [A]n exporter is less likely to ship to a market if that exporter does not know and 
cannot reasonably predict what the amount of duties will be. This lack of transparency and 
predictability will also contribute to distorting the prices of imports by impeding the transmission 
of international prices to the domestic market.”
40
 
The question of whether a PRS is a border measure similar to an illegal “variable import levy” turns 
on whether the PRS exhibits the features deemed essential by the Appellate Body. In the particular 
instance of Peru’s PRS, the analysis is relatively straightforward. 
The Peruvian PRS is inherently variable. As explained, the PRS levies an additional duty or rebate 
through a mathematical formula subject to change every fortnight. On this point, there was not a deep 
disagreement between the parties.
41
 The Panel found that because the duties resulting from the PRS 
were subject to change every two weeks, the requirement of variability was met.
42
  
Beyond variability, however, the PRS must also embody some other characteristic that makes it 
intrinsically different than an ordinary customs duty. The Panel focused on transparency and 
predictability. Although the Appellate Body has highlighted that these need not be the differentiating 
characteristics, the fact that this was the emphasis of a past ruling made it the logical starting point for 
the second part of the analysis. Peru attempted to argue that the PRS was transparent and predictable 
by highlighting how many elements of its formula are made explicit and how private parties can 
predict with some accuracy the result of applying the PRS formula.
43
 The Panel, however, noted that 
certain elements nevertheless remained non-transparent or difficult to predict and that the PRS remains 
less transparent and predictable than an ordinary customs duty.
44
  
Consequently, the Panel held that the duties arising from the PRS constitute a variable import levy, 
or at the very least, share sufficient characteristics making them similar to a variable import levy.
45
 
Because Peru maintained such duties and had not converted them to an ordinary customs duty, it was 
in breach of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
46
 The Panel further ruled that such duties 
violated Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994.
47
 
Although we believe that the Panel ruled correctly on the issue of whether the duties associated 
with the PRS constitute variable import levies or are measures similar to variable import levies, two 
open questions are worth highlighting. Both relate to the question of whether a PRS could ever be 
crafted in a WTO-consistent manner. 
First, in the present case, the PRS was deemed variable because the reference price was subject to 
change every fortnight. Note that the Appellate Body’s language in Chile – Price Band System 
referred to variability as being inherent in any “scheme or formula that causes and ensures that levies 
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change automatically and continuously.”48 The Appellate Body noted that “[o]rdinary customs duties, 
by contrast, are subject to discrete changes in applied tariff rates that occur independently, an 
unrelated to such an underlying scheme or formula.”49 In this dispute, the fact that duties related to the 
PRS were subject to potential change every two weeks was deemed to be frequent enough to meet the 
“continuously” requirement put forward by the Appellate Body. 
But suppose that the PRS relied upon a reference price that was updated monthly or quarterly. 
Would that still qualify as “continuously”? If a government kept the duty / rebate associated with the 
PRS fixed beyond a certain period of time, could it no longer be considered “variable”? If so, how 
long would this period need to be?  
Suppose the reference price for the PRS were tweaked only twice a year, along with the floor and 
ceiling price. In this hypothetical, it would be hard to argue that the PRS is a scheme that causes duties 
to change continuously. Nevertheless, it would also not be the case that the additional duty amounts to 
an ordinary customs duty, at least as far as the concept is defined by the Appellate Body. The duty 
would still be set by a discrete formula; it would not be set independently of any scheme or formula.  
This thought exercise raises a question as to whether the original language of “continuously” as 
employed by the Appellate Body in Chile – Price Band System is necessarily the term that best 
captures what the notion of variability sought in its exposition of a variable import levy. It would 
appear that a levy need not be altered continuously in order for it to be variable. What is important, in 
our view, is the question of whether the additional duty/ rebate associated with the PRS is fixed for a 
period that is sufficiently long enough for foreign producers to predict reasonably what duties it will 
face at the border. If not, then the duty is variable. When given the opportunity, the Appellate Body 
may wish to clarify this notion.  
Second, could a duty set partially on the basis of a formula ever not be considered a variable import 
levy? The Appellate Body’s guidance in Chile – Price Band suggests that another key differentiator 
for determining variability is whether the levies change automatically. Peru attempted to argue that the 
PRS was not variable because it did not trigger an automatic change in the duty but rather must be 
approved by various state organs. This is a formalistic argument that the Panel roundly rejected, noting 
that the executive authorities are still operating within the parameters of the legislation establishing the 
PRS and hence, the administrative actions are not discretionary.
50
  
However, left unanswered is the question of whether a PRS could ever be designed in a way such 
that the tweaking of the additional duty rate, even if guided by a formula, could ever be considered 
non-automatic and discretionary? For example, what if the change in the tariff rate were implemented 
by legislative, rather than administrative, action? Suppose that the PRS formula served only as 
guidance from the executive branch to the legislature, but the legislature remained free to reset applied 
tariffs as it saw fit. Would the fact that the decision now occurs in a separate branch of government 
matter? What about the fact that the legislature in this hypothetical would not be bound to adhere to 
the informal guidance provided by a PRS, even if it normally does? Does this extra degree of potential 
flexibility render the scheme non-automatic and hence, no longer a variable import levy? Or is this 
still a formal distinction that should not matter, especially if the same outcome is almost always 
achieved in the end? 
Consider one other hypothetical: Suppose the PRS formula, instead of arriving at an absolute 
additional duty, churned out a range. In other words, suppose the PRS only mandated that the 
additional duty lie within the interval [𝐴𝐷𝐿, 𝐴𝐷𝐻] where 𝐴𝐷𝐿 represents the lower bound for the 
additional duty and AD𝐻  represents the upper bound. The upper and lower bound for the range are to 
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be calculated through the use of different coefficients (𝑐𝐿 , 𝑐𝐻), to be added to the formula discussed in 
Section II.1, where 𝑐𝐿 < 𝑐𝐻. In other words, 𝐴𝐷𝐿 = (1 + 𝑏 + 𝑐𝐿)(𝑃𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟 − 𝑃𝑟) and 𝐴𝐷𝐻 = (1 + 𝑏 +
𝑐𝐻)(𝑃𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟 − 𝑃𝑟). The implementing authority, whether an agency within the executive branch or the 
legislature itself, is free to select any duty rate within that range as the additional duty. The same 
notion of an upper and lower bound would exist for the tariff rebate. After selecting the duty/rebate 
rate, the authority would then publish the rate in a gazette for a fixed period of time to provide advance 
notice before it is enacted. 
Would such a scheme provide the necessary discretion for the PRS to not be considered an 
automatic formula? One possibility is to hold that this would depend on the extent of the range. At 
some point, the range might be wide enough for the implementing authority to be viewed as given 
genuine discretionary authority. For example, suppose that 𝐴𝐷𝐻 > 𝐴𝐷𝐿 by 10 percentage points, 
thereby providing a significant range for the authorities to set an ad valorem duty. Another approach, 
however, would be to find, as the Panel did in this dispute, that since the implementing authority is 
still acting within the bounds of the PRS’s mandate, it is not displaying the discretion necessary for the 
scheme to be considered non-automatic. 
These hypotheticals suggest that the concept of a variable import levy, as elaborated upon in Chile 
– Price Band System, requires further interpretative clarification. All of the PRS schemes discussed 
above all remain more complicated, and therefore less predictable and clear, than an ordinary customs 
duty. Is it the case that the Article 4.2 requires that all such schemes to be eliminated? A plausible 
reading of the provision is that the aim of the drafters was to seek exact quantification of the border 
measure. Any measure that impedes this ought to be transformed. If this is the case, then the Appellate 
Body ought to say so even more clearly than it has to date. It can shift away from emphasizing the 
“automatically and continuously” features of a PRS formula as determinative of whether the duty is a 
variable import levy. 
On the other hand, the Appellate Body may instead interpret Article 4.2 more narrowly, as simply 
seeking to ban the imposition of import duties that vary frequently enough such that trading actors are 
not able to plan accordingly. If this is the case, then the Appellate Body’s past emphasis on 
automaticity and the period for which the duty/rebate is fixed may indeed be correct. However, this 
would suggest that there might be a way for a WTO member to design a PRS such that the duties that 
arise out of the PRS would not violate Article 4.2 because it is a variable import levy. Possibilities 
include if the exact duty rate were not fixed by the formula but set as a range, if it were fixed for a 
given period of time with sufficient advance notice, and if it were enacted by the legislature rather than 
an administrative agency within the executive branch. From a policy perspective, a PRS designed in 
this manner might be viewed as less optimal than a PRS designed along the lines of the Peruvian PRS. 
The only saving grace would be that it might be viewed as WTO consistent, whereas the Peruvian 
scheme is not. 
The above discussion highlights the fact that the Appellate Body may wish to clarify further 
whether WTO members retain any policy flexibility to impose some form of a PRS under the 
Agreement on Agriculture and GATT Article II.
51
 Is it the case that all duties arising out of a PRS 
constitute a measure similar to a variable import levy, and therefore, by nature, violate WTO law? 
This question may be of particular importance to developing countries, especially as they consider the 
possibility for further agricultural trade liberalization.  
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Our view is that a shift toward emphasizing the design, architecture, and structure of the PRS as 
determinative may be the right direction in which to guide the jurisprudence.
52
 This continues to allow 
for consideration of whether the formula results in automatic and continuous changes in which the 
results are predictable and transparent, but also opens the possibility for consideration of additional 
factors beyond what is laid out in Chile – Price Band System. It also falls in line with the Appellate 
Body’s approach toward duty schemes under other circumstances, most notably GATT Article III:2.53 
4.2 Minimum Import Price 
A duty arising out of the PRS may also violate Article 4.2 because the PRS imposes minimum import 
price or a measure similar to a minimum import price. In Chile – Price Band System, the Appellate 
Body clarified that “[t]he term ‘minimum import price’ refers generally to the lowest price at which 
imports of a certain product may enter a Member’s domestic market.”54 It further noted that the Panel 
had clarified that “[these] schemes generally operate in relation to the actual transaction value of the 
imports.”55 In the dispute’s compliance proceedings, the Panel further clarified that “a minimum 
import price is a measure which ensures that certain imported products will not enter a domestic 
market at a price lower than a certain threshold, normally by imposing an import duty assessed on the 
basis of the difference between such a threshold and the transaction value of the imported good.”56 The 
Appellate Body subsequently confirmed that the Panel’s approach was in proper accord with its 
understanding of how the provision is to be interpreted.
57
 
In Chile – Price Band System, the Panel found that the price band system imposed by Chile 
constituted a measure that is similar to a minimum import price.
58
 Because a PRS operates in relation 
to a reference price and not the actual transaction price, it is possible, at least in theory, for imports 
under a PRS to enter a market below the floor price set by a PRS. For example, consider a scenario 
where the actual transaction price (𝑃𝑡) is lower than the floor and the reference price, i.e. 𝑃𝑡 < 𝑃𝑟 <
𝑃𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟. This may occur if prices continue to decline in the intervening period following when the 
reference price was last readjusted. So long as the difference between the transaction price and floor 
price is larger than the sum of the original duty plus the additional duty, then the actual transaction 
price will fall below the floor price. Whether this proposition holds true depends, in part, on the 
difference between the transaction and reference price. The greater this divergence, and the lower the 
rate of the original duty, the more likely it is that this will hold. 
Thus, the proper assessment is not whether a PRS imposes a minimum import price but whether it 
is similar to such a policy. The Appellate Body has previously clarified that “[a] measure is ‘similar’ 
to a minimum import price when it shares a sufficient number of characteristics with, and has a design, 
structure, and effects similar to, a minimum import price, even if it is not ‘identical’ to such a scheme 
in all respects.”59  
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Unlike the Panel in Chile – Price Band System, the Panel in Peru – Agricultural Products found 
that the measure imposed by the PRS was not similar to a minimum import price.
60
 It is worth 
reflecting upon the differences between the two schemes to understand what the latter Panel 
considered to be necessary for a PRS to not amount to a violation. Note that the Appellate Body’s 
prior guidance suggests that a Panel must examine and weigh two separate factors: (1) the structure 
and design of the PRS, and (2) the PRS’s effects.  
Let us start by examining the similarities and differences in structure and design. First, note that 
there is a difference in semantics. The Chilean scheme is referred to as a PBS (bando de precios), 
whereas the Peruvian scheme is declared to be a PRS (franja de precios). Upon closer examination, 
however, we find that despite the difference in name, the structure and design of the two systems are 
largely similar. The Chilean PBS does not mandate a true price band; the Peruvians also occasionally 
refer to their scheme occasionally as a price band.
61
 The basic structure and design of the two systems 
are the same - both impose an additional duty through use of a formula in which a reference price is 
compared against a floor price.  
The differences only begin to reveal themselves when we examine how the exact components of 
the formula are computed in the two systems. Three points of contrast are worth noting: First, the 
Peruvian reference price is updated every two weeks, as opposed to weekly for the Chilean reference 
price. Second, the Peruvian reference price is based on the price in a pre-designated market, whereas 
the Chilean reference price is the lowest price found of several markets in relationship to one another. 
Third, the Peruvian scheme requires reference price be converted to c.i.f. terms, thereby incorporating 
freight and insurance costs, whereas the Chilean reference price is left on lower f.o.b. terms. All three 
differences increase the likelihood that the actual transaction price will diverge from the reference 
price by a greater degree when prices fall.  
However, the Panel did not emphasize these design components in elaborating upon why the PRS 
was not similar to a minimum import price. Instead, it focused primarily on the second factor – its 
actual effects. In the earlier dispute, the Chilean government conceded that it was “unlikely” for 
imports to enter the Chilean market at a price below the floor price, but hinged its argument on that the 
fact that it was “not impossible.”62 Hence, the Panel considered it to be a “proxy” or “substitute” for a 
minimum import price.
63
 In contrast, in this dispute, the Peruvian government submitted evidence that 
in approximately 57% of the fortnightly periods since the PRS came into force, various transactions 
entered Peru at a price lower than the reference price and floor price.
64
 These amounted to more than 
one-third of trade transactions recorded over these periods.
65
 The Panel found this evidence to be 
decisive in showing that the measure did not impose a de facto threshold and was therefore not similar 
to a minimum import price.
66
 
On appeal, Guatemala has challenged the Panel’s ruling on whether the PRS is similar to a 
minimum import price.
67
 The Panel’s ruling tees up three points that the Appellate Body may wish to 
clarify. 
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First, did the Panel err in treating the question of whether a PRS constitutes a measure similar to a 
minimum import price as primarily an effects-based test
68
? The PRS, by nature, allows for the 
possibility of the measure will create a de facto threshold price for imports. The Panel’s ruling, along 
with those of the Chile – Price Band Systems dispute, suggest that the burden falls on the respondent 
to prove that this is not the actual effect of the PRS. To do so, the respondent must offer actual 
evidence that imports continue to enter the market below the alleged threshold price created by the 
reference price plus the additional duty arising from the PRS.  
This approach appears to follow the Appellate Body’s prior command that a Panel consider the 
effect of a PRS.
69
 But the prior Appellate Body ruling in Chile – Price Band Systems also required a 
consideration of the structure and design of the PRS.
70
 The Panel ruling leaves open the question of 
what role is to be played by the structure-and-design element of this two-part test. As Guatemala 
rightly noted in its appeal, the PRS does give rise to an implicit minimum price threshold.
71
 But as we 
noted above, there are various elements of the design of the Peruvian PRS that make it more likely that 
actual import transactions would occur below this implicit threshold stipulated in the PRS. However, 
the Panel did not elaborate on any of these in its ruling. After highlighting how the structure of the 
Peruvian PRS is similar to that of the Chilean measure, the Panel then simply goes on to conclude that 
it is not convinced that the Peruvian PRS “lead[s] to the establishment of a minimum import price with 
a de facto threshold” without explaining why this is the case given the PRS’s design.72 The Appellate 
Body may wish to elaborate on the level of analysis that a Panel must provide in its ruling with respect 
to the first part of the two-part test, especially if it is to conclude that the structure and design of the 
PRS also favors the respondent’s arguments. 
Second, when it comes to considering how the PRS affects the price of actual transactions, how 
ought the effect of the PRS be measured? The evidence may be expressed in terms of the percentage 
of total import volume (in either value or quantity), the percentage of total transactions, and/or the 
percentage of days/weeks/other periods in which imports priced below the threshold enter into the 
market. Are all of these acceptable metrics? Or should greater emphasis be placed on one over the 
other? Note that Peru submitted evidence only with respect to the latter two metrics, but not with 
respect to total imports (except for sugar).
73
  
Why does the exact metric matter? At first glance, it may seem impressive that below-threshold 
transactions occurred in 57% of the fortnightly periods in which the PRS was in effect. But whether 
this is the truly the case turns, in our view, on the percentage of total import volume represented by 
such transactions rather than the actual number of transactions themselves or the percentage of periods 
in which they occurred. To demonstrate this point, suppose, for example, that Peru submitted evidence 
of three transactions over a two-week period in which the actual price of the transaction fell below the 
reference and floor prices. Consider a first scenario in which the three transactions were out of more 
than 100 such transactions during the period and amounted to less than 1% of imports of the product in 
that period. Contrast that with a second scenario in which the three transactions identified were out of 
only ten transactions and they amounted to nearly 25% of total imports of the product in that period. In 
both instances, Peru can claim that this is a fortnightly period in which imports entered below the 
alleged threshold. It can also point to three specific transactions. But the actual effect of the PRS 
varies widely depending on the overall context. For that reason, we believe that a respondent, in 
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seeking to demonstrate the effect of the PRS on import price, ought to present evidence in terms of the 
total volume of trade.  
Note that in this dispute, Peru submitted statistical evidence on the total volume of trade for only 
sugar. In that instance, Peru indicated that 3 percent of sugar imports enter below the alleged threshold 
price.
74
 Is this figure sufficient to defeat the allegation of the PRS acting in a manner similar to a 
minimum import price? The Appellate Body will need to consider whether to allow a line to emerge 
naturally through the jurisprudence or elaborate upon it more clearly in its ruling. 
Third, should the respondent, when seeking to prove the actual effect of a PRS, be asked to present 
evidence on a product-specific level? The appeal offers the Appellate Body the opportunity to 
scrutinize whether the statistical evidence offered by Peru in Exhibit PER-90 is sufficient for proving 
that the measure is not similar to a minimum import price. Note that the Peruvian PRS affected 
imports at 45 HS-8 tariff lines. For it not to amount to a measure similar to a minimum import price, it 
ought to be the case that imports below the alleged de facto threshold entered the market with some 
regularity for all of the tariff lines. If, say this were the case with only 43 of the 45 tariff lines, then the 
possibility exists that the PRS acted in a manner similar to a minimum import price, at least with 
respect to the two remaining products.  
In this case, Peru appears to have focused its evidence on the four marker products rather than on 
the associate products.
75
 While the Panel ruling notes that Peru submitted statistical evidence on 
product entries, it is not altogether clear whether or not this evidence spans the entire 45 tariff lines 
associated with the PRS.
76
 If not, then the Appellate Body is faced with the question of whether the 
evidence submitted by Peru is extensive enough for the Panel to have concluded that the PRS does not 
act in a manner similar to a minimum import price. While Peru may be on the right track in terms of 
gathering the statistical evidence to demonstrate the lack of an actual effect, the Appellate Body would 
do well to scrutinize whether the evidence submitted is sufficient when considered on a product-by-
product basis. After all, for the respondent to prevail, the evidence must demonstrate that the PRS does 
not behave similar to a minimum import price each and every product at issue.  
To summarize, the Peru – Agricultural Products dispute raises a number of pressing questions over 
the evidentiary burden necessary for a WTO member to demonstrate that a PRS does not give rise to a 
measure similar to a variable import levv or minimum import price. Hopefully, the Appellate Body 
will clarify some of these issues in the upcoming appeal. In the course of doing so, it will make clearer 
how a WTO member ought to design such a scheme and what types of statistical evidence it ought to 
collect, if it hopes to employ a PRS in line with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
5. Circumventing WTO Obligations Through Subsequent Agreements: Can a WTO-
illegal PRS be Preserved in a Preferential Trade Agreement? 
The preceding Section demonstrated the difficulty of developing and maintaining a PRS in line with a 
country’s obligations under the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture and GATT 1994. Cognizant of the 
possibility that a PRS might run afoul of WTO rules, Peru sought an explicit guarantee from several of 
its trading partners of its flexibility to maintain its PRS. Between 2005 and 2013, Peru signed fourteen 
free trade agreements (FTAs).
77
 Many of these included provisions specifically designed to address the 
PRS.  
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Our examination of the text of Peru’s FTAs suggests that in at least twelve of these agreements, 
Peru managed to negotiate the inclusion of a provision that explicitly recognized its right to retain the 
PRS. Table 2 provides a list of the specific provisions found within the given FTAs. The full text of 
the provision for each FTA can be found in Annex 1. 
Table 2. Provisions in Peru’s FTAs Addressing the PRS 
FTA Partner Date of Entry Into Force Provision Concerning PRS 
Chile 1 March 2009 Article 3.2(11) 
Canada 1 August 2009 Article 218 
Singapore 1 August 2009 Article 2.4(3) 
China 1 March 2010 Chapter 2, Article 19 
European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) 
1 July 2011 Article 3.3 
South Korea 1 August 2011 Article 2.16 
Mexico 1 February 2012 Annex to Article 3.4-A, § 3 
Japan 1 March 2012 Article 28 
Panama 1 May 2012 Annex 2.3, para. 9. 
European Union 1 March 2013 Article 30 
Costa Rica 1 June 2013 Annex 2.3, para. 9 
Guatemala (not yet entered into force) Annex 2.3, para. 9 
Three points emerge out of this analysis: First, Peru was able to obtain a concession recognizing the 
legality of its PRS in most of its FTAs. This is true of the FTAs concluded with other developing 
countries in Latin America as well as those concluded with trading partners outside of the region in 
which Peru would be perceived as being the weaker of the two bargaining parties (e.g., EU, Japan, 
Canada, South Korea). The one agreement in which Peru was not able to secure this type of explicit 
recognition was in its FTA with the United States. 
Second, note that the description of the measure varies by agreement. In some, Peru refers to its 
scheme as a PRS, whereas in others, it is described as a price band. This validates what we noted 
earlier that the difference between a PRS and PBS is often one of semantics. Indeed, lawyers for the 
same government may use the terms interchangeably to describe the same measure. Thus, adjudicators 
would do well to not focus on the terminology of the measure but rather how it operates in practice. As 
noted in the Introduction, a PRS does differ from a pure price band, but it is not always the case that a 
so-called PBS is necessarily reflective of a price band regime rather than a PRS.  
Finally, of most importance to the present dispute is the fact that of the twelve FTAs in which Peru 
secured explicit recognition of its right to maintain a PRS, only one – the Guatemala-Peru FTA – has 
yet to enter into force. Peru argued that nevertheless, despite the FTA not being in force, paragraph 9 
Understanding Agricultural Price Range Systems as Trade Restraints: Peru – Agricultural Products 
25 
of Annex 2.3 of the FTA constitutes a valid defense with respect to its obligations vis-à-vis 
Guatemala.
78
 
Two questions arise from this attempt of a WTO member to utilize FTAs to safeguard a measure 
that may be WTO-inconsistent: First, should a provision of a FTA concluded between two countries 
factor into the interpretation of the WTO obligations of the two countries to each other? Second, does 
the answer change if the FTA is one that has not yet entered into force?  
In prior case law, the Appellate Body has recognized that WTO members may modify the 
obligations between themselves.
79
 However, the question arises as to which mechanisms employed by 
WTO members to modify the obligations must be recognized by WTO adjudicators. In EC – Bananas 
III, the Appellate Body confirmed that Understandings reached in conjunction with WTO dispute 
settlement can serve to modify such obligations.
80
 However, an open question remains with respect to 
preferential trade agreements concluded pursuant to GATT Article XXIV, and in particular, such 
treaties prior to their entry into force. 
Guatemala argued that modifications of WTO rights and obligations can only be done through the 
procedures established in Article X of the WTO Agreement and not through a bilateral treaty.
81
 For a 
Panel to examine whether (a) there is an inconsistency between a FTA and WTO Agreement, and (b) 
the FTA modified the WTO rights of a party, Guatemala argued, would fall outside of a Panel’s terms 
of reference, since Panels cannot consider matter outside of the WTO covered agreements.
82
 
Guatemala’s views were shared by the United States, which offered a similar view as a third party.83 
Peru, on the other hand, argued that WTO treaty provisions are to be interpreted pursuant to the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Article 41 of the VCLT recognizes the right of 
two or more parties to a treaty to modify the treaty provided the possibility of modification exists 
within the treaty (or is not prohibited within the treaty) and the modification does not affect the rights 
and obligations of other parties and is not incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty as a 
whole. According to Peru, a FTA concluded pursuant to GATT Article XXIV serves as a form of 
permissible modification.
84
 Where the provisions of the FTA clash with the WTO Agreement, the 
provision of the FTA should prevail as it represents a subsequent agreement.
85
 
Brazil and the European Union (EU), as third parties, offered similar views as to whether a FTA 
may modify the rights and obligations of a WTO agreement, but suggested that the scope for doing so 
is more limited. Brazil argued that only FTAs that have entered into force may modify the rights and 
obligations between two WTO members.
86
 The EU argued that a modification arises in the WTO 
context only if the FTA includes a specific commitment that a party will refrain from initiating a WTO 
challenge to the other party’s measure.87  
This question of whether a ratified FTA may alter the terms of obligations between WTO members 
remains very much an open point of dispute. The Appellate Body, however, may opt not to address 
                                                     
78
 Ibid., para. 699. 
79
 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) / EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – US), 
WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU, WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA, 26 Nov. 2008, adopted 11 Dec. 2008 and 22 Dec. 2008, para. 217.  
80
 Ibid. 
81
 Panel Report, Peru – Agricultural Products, paras. 7.511-7.512. 
82
 Ibid., para. 7.511. 
83
 Ibid., paras. 7.519-7.520. 
84
 Ibid., para. 7.508. 
85
 Ibid., para. 7.506. 
86
 Ibid., para. 7.518. 
87
 Ibid., para. 7.522. 
Kamal Saggi and Mark Wu 
26 
this question directly in the pending appeal.
88
 Because the Peru-Guatemala FTA had not yet entered 
into force, it does not acquire the formal status of a modification made pursuant to VCLT Article 41. 
To the extent that the Appellate Body wishes to tackle this broader question, it would be simply to 
provide obiter dictum for future disputes. 
Instead, the Appellate Body’s analysis is likely to start with a second, and narrower, question of 
whether the status of a FTA matters when considering the broader question of whether a FTA modifies 
WTO obligations between parties.
89
 The Panel’s view was that it did matter. Consequently, the FTA 
did not amount to a modification pursuant to VCLT Article 31. Nor was it obliged to consider it when 
interpreting the rights established under Article 4.2 of the Agreement of Agriculture between 
Guatemala and Peru in light of VCLT Article 31(3)(a). Finally, the Panel rejected Peru’s argument 
that Guatemala, by persisting with its claim even after ratifying the FTA, violated the obligation under 
DSU Articles 3.7 and 3.10 to engage in dispute settlement proceedings in good faith.
90
 
Pauwelyn (2014) has suggested that Peru should instead have relied on the International Law 
Commission (ILC)’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts when 
making its argument. Article 20 states, “Valid consent by a State to the commission of a given act by 
another State precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to the former State to the extent that the 
act remains within the limits of that consent.” Pauwelyn notes that such an argument turns the question 
into a factual inquiry into whether Guatemala has provided consent in allowing Peru to keep its PRS.  
Indeed, Peru appears to have adopted Pauwelyn’s suggested tactic in its appeal. Peru’s appeal 
contends that even if the FTA is not a subsequent agreement per VCLT Article 31(3)(a), it is 
nevertheless a “relevant rule of international law” within the meaning of VCLT Article 31(3)(c).91 
This is on the basis of ILC Articles 20 and 45 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility as rules of 
international law. 
Even when evaluated on this basis, however, it is still unclear to us that Peru will prevail. In US – 
Line Pipe, the Appellate Body made clear that the ILC Articles on State Responsibility “do not 
constitute a binding legal instrument as such.”92 Consequently, the Appellate Body adopted a two-part 
approach of analyzing whether a particular provision of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility ought 
to be considered when interpreting a WTO provision. First, it examined whether the particular 
provision of the ILC Articles is relevant to the analysis. Then, it examined the second question of 
whether that particular provision rose to the level of customary international law. This tact is derived 
from the language of VCLT Article 31(3)(c), which commands the treaty interpreter to consider 
“relevant rules of international law.” 
This approach raises several interesting questions for the Appellate Body and challenges for Peru in 
its appeal: First, how tight must the nexus be between the particular provision of the ILC Articles on 
State Responsibility and the particular provision of a WTO agreement in order for the former to be 
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considered “relevant”? In previous instances, the particular provision of the ILC Articles spoke 
directly to a narrow question of interpretation of the provision of the WTO covered agreement at issue 
in the dispute. For example, in US – Line Pipe, the Appellate Body confronted a question over how 
Article 5.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards ought to be interpreted; Article 51 of the ILC Articles 
spoke directly to the issue at hand concerning the proportionality of countermeasures.
93
 Similarly, in 
US – AD/CVD (China), the Appellate Body confronted a question over how the term “public body” 
found in Article 2 of the SCM Agreement ought to be interpreted; Article 4 of the ILC Articles spoke 
directly to the issue of how to consider state organs, regardless of their formal position in the 
organizational structure.
94
  
Following this logic, Peru then would need to demonstrate that interpretation of a given term in a 
WTO covered agreement remains in doubt and that the particular provision of the ILC Articles on 
State Responsibility directly serves to answer that question. Peru has argued that a question of 
interpretation exists with respect to the term “good faith” as used in Article 3.10 of the DSU.95 The 
provisions of the ILC Article to which Peru is referring, Articles 20 and 45, do not speak directly to 
the issue of “good faith” for dispute settlement procedures but rather to the issue of “consent [that] 
precludes the wrongfulness of the act.”96 While the issues are related, they are not identical, as was the 
case in the previous instances when the Appellate Body sought to draw on the ILC Articles on State 
Responsibility for interpretation. To the extent that a nexus exists, it is not as direct as the previous 
instances. This raises the questions of whether the provision is “relevant” for the interpretation of the 
provision at issue, and if so, what makes it so. The appeal, therefore, presents the Appellate Body with 
an opportunity to clarify when precisely a provision of the ILC Articles can be drawn upon for 
interpretation purposes because it is “relevant”.97 Such clarification is important, especially as the 
Appellate Body has already made clear in US – Line Pipe that the ILC Articles on State Responsibility 
are not a binding instrument on WTO members.
98
 
Second, even if Peru demonstrates that Articles 20 and 45 of the ILC Articles on State 
Responsibility are “relevant,” it would need to convince the Appellate Body that the particular 
provisions amount to customary international law. The Appellate Body’s past jurisprudence suggests 
that it does not consider the entire text of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility to be customary 
international law. Instead, it examines the question on a provision-by-provision basis.
99
 Only when the 
Appellate Body finds a particular provision of the ILC Articles to rise to the level of customary 
international law will it then rely upon that provision to resolve a question of interpretation in line with 
VCLT Article 31(3)(c).  
Because the ILC Articles of State Responsibility are not an international agreement, the Appellate 
Body cannot resort to the typical approach of examining the breadth of its signatories and whether the 
particular parties to the dispute have ratified the agreement. Instead, the Appellate Body has relied 
upon consideration of two other factors to determine whether a particular provision amounts to 
customary international law: First, has the particular provision been cited as such in another 
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international judgment? Second, has the WTO member against whom the provision is being invoked 
either explicitly or tacitly acknowledged the provision as such? 
In US – Line Pipe, the Appellate Body cited two past judgments of the International Court of 
Justice to assert that Article 51 of the ILC Articles amounted to customary international law.
100
 It also 
cited explicit acknowledgment by the United States of the principle noted in Article 51 in the 
commentary submitted by the U.S. on the ILC Articles.
101
 In US – AD/CVD (China), the Appellate 
Body cited a Panel report in a previous case as support for Article 4 of the ILC Articles being 
customary international law.
102
 In that instance, the Appellate Body considered the respondent, the 
United States, to have given tacit acknowledgement to this fact, by not having challenged this 
contention in its appeal or made note of its disagreement before the Dispute Settlement Body.  
In this instance, is it the case that Articles 20 and 45 of the ILC Articles of State Responsibility 
have similarly been cited in past legal judgments and acknowledged by the parties? If not, then the 
Appellate Body will have to decide whether it wishes to defer on the question of whether the particular 
provisions amount to customary international law and not rely upon them for its judgments – as it did 
with Article 5 of the ILC Articles in US – AD/CVD (China).103 Again, the appeal presents an 
opportunity for the Appellate Body to clarify when a non-binding international legal text can be 
considered in WTO treaty interpretation. 
As noted above, Peru will face significant hurdles in demonstrating to the Appellate Body that 
Articles 20 and 45 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility ought to be considered in the context of 
interpreting the legal provisions at issue in this dispute. But even if the Appellate Body agrees that 
Articles 20 and 45 are “relevant rules of international law” for assisting with treaty interpretation in 
this context, it still faces interesting questions over how the provision ought to be considered. 
Article 20 speaks to “valid consent” that “precludes the wrongfulness of the act . . . to the extent 
that the act remains within the limits of that consent.” Article 45 speaks to the waiver of a claim by the 
injured party. How then should the Appellate Body consider what amounts to “valid consent” and 
“waiver” in a context where a FTA has only been ratified by one party and not yet entered into force? 
Although Guatemala did ratify the FTA during the course of the dispute, it is unclear that this 
ratification represents an absolute consent as opposed to a contingent consent. The ratification process 
does not oblige Guatemala to consent unilaterally to all that it has agreed to in the FTA, including its 
explicit recognition of WTO-inconsistent measures enacted by Peru, without any action on the part of 
Peru. Rather, Guatemala’s consent is only contingent upon Peru’s ratification. In the absence of such 
notice, Guatemala would not appear to have provided explicit consent. 
A similar argument can be made with respect to the question of waiver. Again, Guatemala will 
likely argue that its ratification does not require it to waive claims against Peru upon the moment of 
ratification, but instead is contingent upon Peru’s ratification. Without this reciprocal action, nothing 
has been waived.  
Finally, there is the question of the treaty language that the FTA must employ in order for a WTO 
member to consent to a WTO-illegal act and/or waive its right to WTO dispute settlement. The EU has 
put forward the position that the language must be explicit and refer specifically to an agreement to 
refrain from initiating a WTO challenge. Peru, on the other hand, will likely contend that consent and 
waiver can be implicit, even without direct treaty language in the FTA concerning WTO challenges. 
The appeal also presents the Appellate Body with an opportunity to decide this question, if it desires. 
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Most likely, however, this dispute will serve to resolve only a subset of the questions identified 
above. Because this dispute involves a FTA that has not yet entered into force, its fact pattern is more 
unusual, and the appeal will not necessarily serve to definitively answer the question of how FTAs 
between WTO members should factor in a subsequent WTO challenge involving those parties. Yet, 
that question is one clearly lurking over the WTO. Imagine instead if one of Peru’s other FTA 
partners, with a FTA that has already entered into force, brought a similar dispute. The question of 
whether they can do so is of paramount importance to WTO members as they negotiate increasing 
numbers of FTAs with one another. Having additional clarity into whether WTO members can 
circumvent WTO rights through FTAs, and if so, what treaty language is necessary to do so, will be of 
benefit to the system as a whole.  
6. Conclusion 
Because of the sensitivities associated with the agricultural sector, a PRS continues to be viewed as a 
potentially attractive policy instrument to complement agricultural trade liberalization. This may be 
particularly the case with small open economies that take world prices as given. A PRS offers it the 
ability to restrain prices for agricultural products in its domestic market, even after opening up its 
market to trade. 
While the political rationale for a PRS is well understood, the legal and economic issues associated 
with the policy are not. This article suggests that from an economic welfare standpoint, a PRS 
represents a sub-optimal policy intervention for a small open economy that seeks to maximize its 
expected welfare. However, under certain conditions, a government may nevertheless choose to 
implement a PRS in order to ensure that, with agricultural trade liberalization, the welfare of 
consumers and producers do not fall below a certain minimum threshold in light of significant risk 
aversion on the part of either group in the presence of incomplete or missing insurance markets.  
WTO law, and in particular the obligations of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture to 
convert non-tariff barriers to tariffs, present a number of significant legal constraints on the PRS. The 
structure and design of a PRS create an implicit minimum price threshold, and the duties generated by 
a PRS can operate as a variable import levy. Thus, a WTO member seeking to prove that a PRS is 
consistent with its WTO obligations faces heavy burden. The Panel ruling in the Peru – Agricultural 
Products dispute gives rise to a number of unanswered legal questions as to what is required of WTO 
members that seek to preserve the flexibility to implement a PRS; the Appellate Body may seek to 
clarify some of these questions in the ongoing appeal. 
Finally, the particular zeal with which Peru has sought to preserve its right to maintain the PRS 
through explicit recognition in preferential trade agreements raises interesting questions about the 
relationship between provisions in FTAs and WTO agreements. In this case, the Panel was able to 
avoid providing an answer outright because of the fact that the applicable FTA had not yet entered into 
force. But given the expanding nature of preferential trade agreements and the stalled multilateral 
round, it is simply a matter of time before WTO adjudicators are confronted with this question 
outright. We would all do well to consider carefully how we envision these multiple treaty schemes to 
intersect with one another in the realm of WTO dispute settlement.  
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Annex  
 
Canada – Peru FTA 
ARTICLE 128: PRICE BAND SYSTEM 
Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, Peru may maintain its Price Band System established 
in the D.S. N
o
 115-2001-EF and its amendments, with respect to the products subject to the application 
of the system as set out in Annex 218. 
 
Chile-Peru FTA 
ARTÍCULO 3.2: PROGRAMA DE LIBERACIÓN 
11. En la utilización del Sistema de Banda de Precios, vigente en Chile, o de Derechos Especificos 
Variables vigentes en el Perú, relativas a la importación de mercaderías, las Partes se 
comprometen en el ámbito del presente Acuerdo, a no incluir nuevas mercancias ni a modificar los 
mecanismos o aplicarlos de tal forma que signifique un deterioro de las condiciones de acceso a 
sus respectivos territories. 
 
China – Peru FTA 
CHAPTER 2. NATIONAL TREATMENT AND MARKET ACCESS FOR GOODS 
ARTICLE 19: PRICE BAND SYSTEM 
Peru may maintain its Price Band System established in the D.S. N
o
 115-2001-EF and its amendments, 
respect to the products subject to the application of the system and provided in Annex 3 (Price Band 
System). 
 
Costa Rica – Peru FTA 
ANEXO 2.3. PROGRAMA DE ELIMINACIÓN ARANCELARIA 
9.  Perú podrá mantener su Sistema de Franja de Precios en el D.S. N
o
 115-2001-EF y sus 
modificatorias, respecto a los productos sujetos a la aplicación del sistema indicado con un 
asterisco (*) en la columna 4 en la Lista de Perú establecida en este Anexo.  
 
EFTA States - Peru FTA 
ARTICLE 3.5: PRICE BAND SYSTEM 
Peru may maintain its Price Band System for agricultural products as set out in Appendix 3 to Annex 
III (Processed Agricultural Products). 
 
EU – Peru FTA 
ARTICLE 30: PRICE BAND SYSTEM 
Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement: . . .  
(b) Peru may apply its Price Band System established in the Supreme Decree 115-2001-EF and its 
modifications, or subsequent systems for agricultural goods covered in such Decree. 
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Guatemala – Peru FTA 
ANEXO 2.3. ELIMINACIÓN ARANCELARIA 
9.  Perú podrá mantener su Sistema de Franja de Precios, establecido en el Decreto Supremo N
o
 
1152001EF y sus modificatorias, respecto a los productos sujetos a la aplicación del sistema 
indicado con un asterisco (*) en la columna 4 en la Lista de Perú establecida en este Anexo.  
 
Japan – Peru FTA 
ARTICLE 28: PRICE BAND SYSTEM 
Peru may maintain its Price Band System referred to in Note 2 of Section 1 of the Schedule of Peru in 
Annex 1, with respect to the agricultural goods specified in one asterisk (“*”) in column 5 of its 
Schedule. 
 
Korea – Peru FTA 
ARTICLE 2.16: PRICE BAND SYSTEM 
Peru may maintain its price band system, established in its Supreme Decree N
o
 115-2001-EF and its 
amendments, with respect to the goods subject to the application of the system and listed in Annex 2D. 
 
Mexico – Peru FTA 
ANEXO AL ARTÍCULO 3.4-A. PROGRAMA DE ELIMINACIÓN ARANCELARIA 
SECCIÓN 3: NOTAS PARA LA LISTA DEL PERÚ 
Perú podrá mantener su Sistema de Franja de Precios establecido en el Decreto Supremo N
o
 115-2001-
EF y sus modificatorias, únicamente para las mercancias sujetas a la aplicación del Sistema indicado 
con un asterisco (*) en la columna 6 de la Lista. En caso que dicho Sistema sea modificado o 
eliminado, Perú otorgará a México de manera inmediata e incondicional el trato que surja de dicha 
modificación o eliminación.  
 
Panama – Peru FTA 
ANEXO 2.3. ELIMINACIÓN ARANCELARIA 
9.  Perú podrá mantener su Sistema de Franja de Precios, establecido en el Decreto Supremo N
o
 115-
2001-EF y sus modificatorias, respecto a los productos sujetos a la aplicación del Sistema indicado 
con un asterisco (*) en la Lista de Perú establecida en el Anexo 2.3 (Programa de Eliminación 
Arancelaria).  
 
Singapore – Peru FTA 
ARTICLE 2.4: ELIMINATION OF CUSTOMS DUTIES 
1. Peru shall maintain the application of its Price Band System as established in its Supreme Decree 
115-2001-EF and 197-2002-EF and its subsequent legal moifications or succeeding system, for the 
products covered by that Decrees.  
 
  
Understanding Agricultural Price Range Systems as Trade Restraints: Peru – Agricultural Products 
33 
Figure 1: Effects of the PRS system on a small open economy 
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